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Ideological Interests and US Support for Taiwan: A Structural Analysis of Hegemonic Competition

Ideological Interests and US Support for Taiwan: A Structural Analysis of Hegemonic Competition

Jaw-Nian Huang

Jaw-Nian Huang is Associate Professor at the Graduate Institute of Development Studies, National Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan (jnhuang@nccu.edu.tw).

ABSTRACT:

Through the lens of hegemonic competition, this article examines how the ideological dimensions of US interests have shaped its support for Taiwan from the Cold War to the New Cold War. A longitudinal case study and discourse analysis revealed that shifts in US competition with other major powers have shaped Taiwan’s ideological significance across different historical periods – from an anti-communist stronghold in the early Cold War and a model of capitalist modernisation in the late Cold War, to a beacon of democracy in the post-Cold War era and a frontline against authoritarian expansion in the new Cold War. Theoretically, the study underscores the role of ideological interests alongside security and economic factors, offering a systematic discussion on the interplay between geopolitical-economic logic and ideological considerations. Empirically, it provides insights in respect of the ideological dimensions of US foreign policy, informing the value-based public diplomacy strategies of Taiwan and other liberal democracies.

KEYWORDS: hegemonic competition, ideology, foreign policy, United States, Taiwan.

Top-right: peer-reviewed article

Since the Cold War, the US has repeatedly offered military support to Taiwan during crises in the Taiwan Strait, such as during the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, the First, Second, and Third Taiwan Strait Crises (1954–55, 1958, and 1995–96), and China’s military exercises around Taiwan in 2022. Regardless of whether it was before or after the severance of US–Taiwan diplomatic ties in 1979, the US has provided Taiwan with considerable support not only in military security but also in the economic, political, and diplomatic domains. What motivates the US to offer such defence and support to Taiwan?

Existing research highlights the influence of various national interests – defence, economic, and ideological – on US policy towards Taiwan (Fong 2026a). Studies have highlighted US security interests in Taiwan, including securing a geopolitical chokepoint (Erickson and Wuthnow 2016; Beckley and Brands 2023), ensuring freedom of navigation in the Taiwan Strait  (You and Hao 2018; Xin and Wang 2023), advancing arms sales interests, and strengthening multilateral security cooperation (Bellocchi 2023; Liff 2025). These measures contribute to bolstering allied confidence, deterring Chinese aggression, and maintaining the balance of power in the Taiwan Strait. Other studies have emphasised Taiwan’s economic significance to the US, including its longstanding role as an international trade hub,^[1] a key site for American corporate investment (Lee and Maher 2022), and its contemporary role in the global high-tech supply chain (Shattuck 2021; Chiang 2023). The latter involves the production and supply of advanced semiconductors and other high-tech intermediate goods, which play a crucial role in US efforts to counterbalance China’s rise and to secure its technological security and dominance. Additionally, some scholars have noted the ideological dimension of US interests in Taiwan, seeing it as an ally in containing communist expansion (Hamrin and Wang 2004; Copper 2022), a model of capitalist modernisation and democracy-driven development (Krumbein 2019; Mori 2019), a symbol of democracy’s superiority over authoritarianism (Carothers et al. 2007; Brands 2018), and a strategic counterbalance against authoritarian expansion (Copper 2022; Bellocchi 2023).

While the existing literature provides valuable insights into US support for Taiwan from different national interest perspectives, it lacks a systematic discussion on the interconnections between security, economic, and ideological considerations. Moreover, there is relatively little analysis of the internal linkages among the various ideological interests the US has in Taiwan. This study adopts a structural perspective on hegemonic competition to explore how evolving geopolitical and economic rivalry among major powers since the Cold War has shaped US ideological interests and support for Taiwan.

Background

Ideology in great power competition

Mainstream international relations theory tends to focus on the influence of material factors such as the distribution of power among states and to overlook the role of ideological factors. However, several studies have highlighted the profound impact of ideology on a country’s foreign policy and international relations (Gries and Yam 2020). Theoretically, ideological and power-related factors are not mutually exclusive; rather, they can complement and integrate with one another. Specifically, ideology shapes national leaders’ definitions of national interests, including how to safeguard domestic institutions and ways of life from external interference. It also influences their perceptions of the international power structure, including the sources and extent of threats and opportunities, thereby affecting foreign policy as well as patterns of cooperation and competition among great powers.

Historically, the cooperative and competitive dynamics among great powers have largely corresponded with the degree of ideological divergence. Since the twentieth century, instances where major powers have shared similar ideological orientations – for example, the Soviet Union and China prior to 1958, Western democracies from 1945 onwards, and reformist Soviet leaders and Western democracies in the late 1980s – appear to have facilitated cooperation and even alliances. Conversely, when ideological differences have been stark – such as between the Axis and Allied powers during World War II, between the Soviet Union and the US during the Cold War, and between China and the US today – competition and even confrontation have been more likely (Haas 2005; Brands 2018).

Recognising that reducing ideological divergence with other states enhances national security, the US has long pursued an ideology-driven foreign policy tradition characterised by promoting liberal ideology and institutions (e.g., human rights and democracy) (Haas 2005). In addition to reducing ideological differences with other states and safeguarding domestic ways of life from external interference, great powers also export their ideology to assert the dominance of their political and economic systems within the international order.

Cultural hegemony in international relations

Cox’s concept of cultural hegemony in international relations, which is derived from Gramsci’s notion of cultural hegemony, explains how core states employ ideology to construct world hegemony. According to Cox, core states, which are relatively advanced due to revolutions in production modes, not only tend to establish domination-subordination relationships over peripheral, less-developed states materially but also promote the adoption of their production models, along with the ideas, norms, and institutions that sustain them. In doing so, they construct ideological domination and consent, thereby establishing and maintaining a world order that serves the interests of core states (Cox 1983).

Based on this perspective, this article argues that American support for Taiwan is determined not only by its security and economic interests in Taiwan but also by its ideological interests. US ideological interests in Taiwan, alongside the island’s symbolic significance, are embedded in the “structure of hegemonic competition” – a framework defined by prevailing ideological contradictions with its main great power rivals across different historical periods (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Theoretical framework

Source: author.

Methods and data

To validate the above argument, this article employs a longitudinal case study supplemented by congruence analysis. Congruence analysis focuses on examining periods when US security and economic interests in Taiwan had significantly declined. Examples include the late Cold War, when the US pursued a strategy of aligning with China to counter the Soviet Union, and the post-Cold War era, when the US sought to deepen its investment and trade relations with China. Through this approach, the study investigates whether the US continued to provide support for Taiwan when Taiwan’s geopolitical-economic significance appeared less pronounced. If this is the case, it would suggest that material interests, such as security and economic factors, are not the sole considerations in US policy towards Taiwan.

The longitudinal case study also examines how the structure of world hegemonic competition across different historical periods since the Cold War has shaped the nature of US ideological interests in Taiwan, and how this, in turn, has influenced US support for Taiwan. Based on the evolving competitive and cooperative relationships between the US and its rivals, this study divides the process of world hegemonic competition since the Cold War into four distinct periods: the early Cold War (1950s–1960s), the late Cold War (1970s–1980s), the post-Cold War era (1990s–late 2010s), and the new Cold War (late 2010s–present). Using discourse analysis, the study examines key policy statements and political leaders’ rhetoric to uncover how Taiwan’s symbolic significance to the US is reflected in US policies towards Taiwan.

To examine US understandings of Taiwan’s symbolic significance, the primary data comprises US executive and legislative archives, supplemented by secondary literature and news reports. The data collection focuses on agreements between the US and Taiwan, US government policy and legal documents, and statements by American political leaders. Key databases include the US Department of State’s Office of the Historian diplomatic archives, the American Presidency Project at the University of California and the US Congress’s federal legislation database.

Ideological interests as drivers of US-led support for Taiwan

US ideological interests transformed Taiwan from a “beacon of anti-communism” during the Cold War into a “beacon of democracy” in the post-Cold War era (Fong 2026b). This transformation did not occur overnight, however, but developed gradually alongside shifts in the structure of hegemonic competition.

The early Cold War (1950s–1960s)

With the decline of power in Western Europe and Japan after World War II, the US gradually recognised the Soviet Union as its primary competitor in the effort to rebuild the world order, and it developed a series of foreign policies aimed at preventing the expansion of Soviet-led communist forces across regions of the globe. The announcement of the Truman Doctrine in March 1947 marked the start of the Cold War – an ideological contest between capitalism and communism (Kennedy 1989). In April 1950, the US Department of State issued the National Security Council Paper NSC-68, which explicitly identified the Soviet Union’s “hostile design” over the past few years as the greatest threat faced by the US. It noted that the Soviet Union was “animated by a new fanatic faith” antithetical to that of the US and was driven “to impose its absolute authority over the rest of the world.” As a result, the “violent and non-violent” conflict between the two powers had become “endemic.” The report recommended that the US government focus on “a more rapid building up of the political, economic, and military strength of the free world” to deter Soviet expansionist ambitions.^[2]

Within this structure of hegemonic competition, after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, the US incorporated Taiwan into its capitalist camp from the early 1950s onward, viewing Taiwan as a pillar for containing Soviet and Chinese communist expansion in the Western Pacific region, and providing a range of military and political support to Taiwan. After the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, President Truman recognised that “the occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to United States forces” and decided to deploy the Seventh Fleet to prevent a communist attack on Taiwan while also calling on the Taiwanese authorities to cease air and naval operations against the Mainland.^[3] This policy was seen as an effort to neutralise the Taiwan Strait. In 1953, President Eisenhower, considering communist China’s alignment with the Soviet Union, announced that the Seventh Fleet would “no longer be employed to shield Communist China,”^[4] marking the end of the Taiwan Strait’s neutralisation and strengthening Taiwan’s role as an anti-communist base. In 1954, the US signed the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan, which stipulated a joint commitment to “resist armed attack and communist subversive activities” as well as to “strengthen their free institutions and to cooperate with each other in the development of economic progress and social well-being.”^[5] In 1955, when urging Congress to pass the Formosa Resolution, Eisenhower emphasised that “all the free nations” had a “common interest” in ensuring that “Formosa and the Pescadores should not fall into the control of aggressive Communist forces.”^[6] The resolution authorised the president to use armed forces for their defence.^[7] These expectations from the US also reflected the self-expectations of the Taiwanese authorities. According to Chiang Kai-shek, Taiwan bore a “twofold mission” within the “global anti-Communist camp”: first, to “consolidate Taiwan as a stronghold,” and second, to “stand as the outpost of the democratic front on the Pacific,” serving as “the key to safeguarding collective security.” He further asserted that “countering the aggression of the Communist International in the Western Pacific” was “a shared responsibility between the ROC (Republic of China) and the US.”^[8] Taiwan’s substantive and symbolic significance prompted a series of military and political support measures from the US. For instance, the US deployed aircraft carriers to assist Taiwan during the Korean War and the two Taiwan Strait crises of 1954–55 and 1958. The Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty was signed in 1954, and US military personnel and advisory groups were stationed in Taiwan from 1951 to 1979. Furthermore, the US supported the ROC’s membership in the United Nations and other international organisations until 1971.

The US also viewed Taiwan as a testing ground for the practice of Western capitalism in Asia. Between 1951 and 1965, the US provided Taiwan with a total of USD 1.48 billion in economic aid. While initially aiming to contain communist expansion and reduce the need for direct US military deployment, after 1958, the focus shifted to promoting economic growth and reducing dependency on US aid (Jacoby 1966). Through this aid, Taiwan was able to mitigate the adverse effects of trade deficits during its import substitution industrialisation phase in the 1950s and achieve self-sufficiency in industrial products. By the 1960s, under US guidance, Taiwan transitioned to export-oriented industrialisation, which fostered the growth of private and foreign enterprises, investment, production, and exports and integrated Taiwan into the global capitalist division of labour (Shiau 1989). Taiwan achieved its first overall trade surplus in 1964 and recorded its first trade surplus with the US in 1968. Given this economic success, the US later regarded Taiwan as a model for the successful implementation of Western capitalism in Asia. On the 10th anniversary of US aid to Taiwan, Eisenhower expressed hope that “free China” would have “an opportunity, which is at the same time a responsibility, to demonstrate to less developed nations the way to economic growth in freedom,” especially when “confronted with the harsh example of the Communist way on the mainland.”^[9] After US aid ended, President Johnson also recognised Taiwan’s role as a model for other countries, noting that “As valiant soldiers in the war against hunger and want – the war on which the future of civilization depends – farmers and technicians from Taiwan have travelled to other countries, other continents, to offer help, knowledge, and technical ability to less fortunate peoples.”^[10]

In summary, in terms of security, Taiwan served since the Korean War as a front-line stronghold in the Western Pacific to contain the expansion of the Soviet Union and its allies. Economically, although Taiwan generated a modest trade surplus for the US (USD 1.19 billion) between 1952 and 1967,^[11] it received even greater US economic aid (USD 1.48 billion) between 1951 and 1965, making its economic value to the US relatively limited. Ideologically, Taiwan served as a bastion of capitalism against communism. Taken together, Taiwan’s geopolitical security and symbolic significance drove the US to provide substantial diplomatic and defence support.

The late Cold War (1970s–1980s)

By the 1970s, while the Cold War structure remained in place, the US began to pursue détente, including a geopolitical strategy of cooperating with China to counterbalance the Soviet Union. In 1970, President Nixon, in his first annual report to Congress on US foreign policy, noted that given the Sino-Soviet border conflicts and China’s growing military strength, “improved practical relations with Peking” would be “our interest, and in the interest of peace and stability in Asia and the world.”^{<!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[12]<!--[endif]-->} Henry Kissinger, then National Security Advisor, later clarified this as a policy whereby the US “need the Chinese to correct the Russians, and to discipline the Russians.”^[13] Under these policy guidelines, the US supported the PRC’s admission to the UN in 1971, which indirectly prompted the ROC’s withdrawal. Nixon’s 1972 visit to China produced the Shanghai Communiqué, followed by the 1979 Normalization Communiqué that established diplomatic relations with the PRC and ended ties with the ROC. The 1982 Third Joint Communiqué further consolidated this framework, and together, the three communiqués formed the institutional basis for US–China strategic cooperation.

Under this hegemonic structure, although Taiwan was no longer on the frontline of US anti-communist geopolitical strategy, the US continued to regard Taiwan as a model of capitalist economic development for communist and developing countries, and continued to help safeguard its security and political-economic system. In 1979, at the time of its diplomatic severance with the ROC, the US passed and implemented the Taiwan Relations Act, which expressed the US’s responsibility for Taiwan’s socio-economic system and its concern for human rights in Taiwan. The act emphasised the US’s commitment to help “resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan,” and stated, “The preservation and enhancement of the human rights of all the people on Taiwan are hereby reaffirmed as objectives of the United States.” It further declared that “Nothing contained in this Act shall contravene the interest of the United States in human rights, especially with respect to the human rights of all the approximately 18 million inhabitants of Taiwan.”^{<!--[if !supportFootnotes]-->[14]<!--[endif]-->} With these ideational considerations, the Taiwan Relations Act pledged to maintain substantive commercial, cultural, and other relations with Taiwan and provide defensive arms in response to any attempt to resolve the Taiwan issue by non-peaceful means. Aligning with the act’s spirit, President Reagan provided Taiwan’s authorities with the “Six Assurances” before signing the Third Joint Communiqué with the PRC in 1982 (which stipulated that the US would gradually reduce arms sales to Taiwan). The key point of these assurances was that the US’s willingness to reduce arms sales to Taiwan would depend on China’s continued commitment to resolving cross-strait differences peacefully – meaning that the US would increase arms sales to Taiwan if China adopted a more hostile stance.^[15] Consistent with US policy aims, the Taiwanese authorities valued and sought to advance the island’s socio-economic progress. According to Chiang Ching-kuo, the ROC’s accomplishments, unlike “the poverty and suffering, enslavement and persecution” that “the Communist system brought to the people of Mainland China,” had “become a beacon of hope for all Chinese people.”^[16] Moreover, Taiwan’s transformation “from a less developed to a highly developed nation” had “provided a practical example and service to other developing countries.”^[17]

Viewing Taiwan as a key partner in promoting Western capitalism and democratic institutions in Asia, the US not only ensured Taiwan’s security but also consistently encouraged Taiwan to adopt US-endorsed economic and political liberalisation reforms. Reagan remarked:

I am proud, as an American, at the great progress that has been made by the people on Taiwan over the past three decades, and of the American contribution to that process. (…) My administration, acting through appropriate channels, will continue strongly to foster that development and to contribute to a strong and healthy investment climate, thereby enhancing the well-being of the people of Taiwan.^[18]

Economically, to address the growing trade deficit with Taiwan since the mid-1970s, the US began pressing Taiwan in the early 1980s to implement a series of neoliberal economic reforms. In 1984, Taiwan introduced policies aimed at “economic liberalisation, internationalisation, and institutionalisation.” These included, at the international level, reducing tariffs and non-tariff barriers, appreciating the New Taiwan dollar, lifting foreign exchange controls, permitting outward investment, and allowing trade with socialist countries. At the domestic level, this involved adopting free-market-oriented policies such as privatisation, marketisation, and deregulation (Shiau 2004). Politically, external economic and political pressure that the US exerted on Taiwan, combined with domestic challenges from political opposition, social movements, and the business sector, led Taiwan to initiate political liberalisation by the late 1980s. For instance, when US Congress raised concerns over major human rights cases in Taiwan in the early 1980s under the “human rights provisions” of the Taiwan Relations Act, Chiang Ching-kuo reportedly conveyed messages, including “Taiwan will democratise,” to the US through the director of the American Institute in Taiwan, James Lilley. This could be seen as Taiwan completing the “assignments” set by the US to ensure its defence commitments (Wakabayashi 2016). Taiwan then lifted martial law, party bans, and press restrictions in 1987, paving the way for democratisation in the 1990s.

While the US reduced its diplomatic support for Taiwan as the island’s geopolitical and economic significance declined, it continued to provide defence support, to a certain degree, due to the enduring symbolic value of Taiwan. In terms of security, Taiwan retreated to the second line of geo-competition because of the Sino–Soviet split and US–China cooperation. Economically, although Taiwan’s growing capitalist development made it an attractive destination for US investment (accounting for 1.32% of total US outward investment between 1970 and 1989),^[19] its success in export-oriented industrialisation resulted in a persistent US trade deficit from 1968 onwards, keeping Taiwan’s economic benefits to the US relatively limited. However, ideologically, Taiwan became a model of capitalist economic development for China and other developing countries. Taken together, despite the significant decline in Taiwan’s instrumental value, its enduring symbolic significance sustained US defence support to some extent.

The post-Cold War era (1990s–late 2010s)

The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 marked the end of the Cold War, after which the US became the world’s sole superpower, while China (and potentially Japan) were regarded as major regional powers in East Asia (Huntington 1999). While the end of the Cold War was posited by some as “the end of history,” predicting that capitalist democracy would become the universal model (Fukuyama 1989), China’s absence from the post-communist wave of democratisation pointed to an emerging ideological competition. This time, the main divide was no longer between capitalism and communism but between democracy and autocracy.

Confronted with an economically rising China that adopted capitalism while maintaining its authoritarian regime, the US sought both to deepen economic cooperation and to promote political reform in China. Economically, considering China’s vast potential as the world’s factory and export market, the US lifted its economic sanctions on China within a few years of the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown and worked to enhance trade and investment relations. As noted in the US National Security Strategy report, “developing a broader engagement with the People’s Republic of China,” which included “delink[ing] China’s Most Favored Nation status from its record on human rights” and facilitating “China’s entry into international trade organisations,” served US economic and strategic interests and led to significant growth in US–China trade.^[20] Politically, unlike the late Cold War period when the US did not aim to alter China’s “local policy” or “ideological outlook,”^[21] the post-Cold War period saw the US hoping to promote human rights improvements and democratic reforms in China by deepening its economic ties with the world. The Clinton Administration emphasised that democracy and human rights, as “universal yearnings and universal norms,” also applied to Asia, asserting that the US “will continue to press for respect for human rights in countries as diverse as China and Burma.”^[22] The Bush administration believed that “WTO membership (…) will require China to strengthen the rule of law and introduce certain civil reforms, such as the publication of rules,” expressing hope that “in the long run, an open, rules-based Chinese economy will be an important underpinning for Chinese democratic reforms.”^[23] The Obama Administration similarly stated that it would “insist that China uphold international rules and norms on issues ranging from maritime security to trade and human rights.”^[24]

Under this structure of hegemonic competition, the US increasingly viewed Taiwan, which had just completed a full parliamentary election in 1992 and direct presidential election in 1996, as a model for demonstrating Western-style capitalist democracy to China and the world. In the 1994 “Taiwan Policy Review,” the Clinton Administration noted that “Taiwan has been one of the world’s greatest economic success stories” and “has taken dramatic strides towards democracy and the fulfilment of human rights.” It further observed that Taiwan’s experience “has shown that political openness must accompany economic reform and that Asians value freedom as much as other peoples around the globe,” in contrast to China, which “has opened up to the outside world, but it clings to a repressive political system.”^[25] When Taiwan experienced its first transfer of political power in 2000, Clinton praised the election as one that “demonstrates the strength and vitality of Taiwan’s democracy.”^[26] Similarly, during Taiwan’s second transfer of political power in 2008, Bush lauded Taiwan as “a beacon of democracy to Asia and the world,”^[27] while Obama affirmed that Taiwan had taken “the latest step in consolidating a democracy.”^[28] In 2016, both the US Senate and House of Representatives also praised Taiwan for having “showed the world again what a mature, Chinese-speaking democracy looks like.”^[29] The successive presidents of Taiwan have also regarded the island’s democratic achievements as “a model for developing countries,” “a milestone for Chinese communities worldwide,” and “a paradigm of democracy in Asia.”^[30] President Chen Shui-bian stated even more explicitly:

The more democratic Taiwan becomes, the stronger its “lighthouse effect” on China’s democratisation will be. This will also contribute to safeguarding security and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, fully aligning with the shared interests of the US, Japan, and neighbouring countries.^[31]

Considering Taiwan’s democratic values, the US continued to provide practical security and other forms of support to Taiwan despite US ongoing efforts to deepen geo-economic cooperation with China. In terms of security, the US not only continued arms sales to Taiwan but also deployed aircraft carriers to protect Taiwan during the 1995–1996 missile launches by China near Taiwan’s coast – known as the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis – prompted by President Lee Teng-hui’s visit to the US and Taiwan’s first presidential election. Regarding Lee’s visit, the Clinton administration explained that granting his visa was “something that the [US] President feels is consistent with the values that we promote in this world as a democracy.”^[32] Meanwhile, Congress highlighted Taiwan as “a model emerging democracy” and emphasised that US interests depended on “supporting democracy and human rights abroad.”^[33] In addition to security support, the 1994 Taiwan Policy Review led to certain improvements in US–Taiwan relations, including granting Taiwan’s leaders the right to transit through the US, allowing US officials to meet with top Taiwanese officials, and advocating for Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organisations.^[34] With US support, after joining the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation alongside China and Hong Kong in 1991, Taiwan joined the World Trade Organization in 2002 following China’s accession. In 2007, the US even issued an informal written statement to the UN, reaffirming that the US “take no position on the status of Taiwan” and rejecting any moves by the UN to consider “Taiwan for all purposes to be an integral part of the PRC,” as demanded by China.^[35]

During this period, there was little change in Taiwan’s substantive and symbolic importance. In terms of security, Taiwan continued to occupy a secondary role in geo-competition amid the collapse of the Soviet Union and the context of constructive US–China engagement. As China emerged as the global manufacturing hub, Taiwan’s economic significance to the US declined. Between 1990 and 2015, Taiwan continued to contribute to the US trade deficit, whilst its share of total US outward investment fell to just 0.48% – less than half that of the preceding period.^[36] Nevertheless, Taiwan served as a model of successful democracy in Asia and the Chinese-speaking world. Therefore, despite its persistently limited instrumental benefits, its enduring symbolic significance sustained US diplomatic and defence support.

The new Cold War (late 2010s–present)

With China’s rise and expansion in the late 2010s, the US began to perceive China as its primary competitor in maintaining hegemony in the Indo-Pacific region and even globally. The main ideological conflict between the US and China remained centred on the competition between democracy and authoritarianism.

Prior to the inauguration of President Trump in 2017, the US strategy towards China primarily “welcomes the rise of a stable, peaceful, and prosperous China” and sought to “develop a constructive relationship with China”^[37] with the expectation that “support for China’s rise and for its integration into the post-war international order would liberalize China.”^[38] However, after Trump took office, the US began to view China as a “revisionist power” or “rival power” that seeks to “spread features of its authoritarian system” and “shape a world antithetical to US values and interests.”^[39] Consequently, US–China relations were redefined as “strategic competition” due to “the divergent nature and goals of our political and economic systems.” The US then set its Indo-Pacific strategic goal as promoting “a shared vision for a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’” while “preventing China from establishing new, illiberal spheres of influence.”^[40] Under Biden’s administration, the US continued to perceive China among “powers that layer authoritarian governance with a revisionist foreign policy” and as “the only competitor with both the intent and, increasingly, the capability to reshape the international order.”^[41] Biden interpreted the competition with China as “a contest, not with China per se, but a contest with autocrats, autocratic governments around the world”^[42] to “show which system of governance [democracy or autocracy] can best deliver for their people and the world.”^[43] Accordingly, the US framed its Indo-Pacific strategic objective as “not to change the PRC but to shape the strategic environment (…) favourable to the United States, our allies and partners, and the interests and values we share.”^[44]

Under this structure of hegemonic competition, the US regarded Taiwan as the frontline of the free world in resisting the expansion of Chinese authoritarianism. Both the Trump and Biden administrations recognised that “The PRC’s coercion and aggression spans the globe, but it is most acute in the Indo-Pacific,”^[45] with Taiwan enduring “increasingly assertive steps to compel unification” with China.^[46] As a result, both the US executive and legislative branches regarded Taiwan as “a vital part of the United States Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy.” For example, Congress has emphasised that “The security of Taiwan and its democracy are key elements of continued peace and stability of the greater Indo-Pacific region, which is in the political, security, and economic interests of the United States.”^[47] Senior national security officials have also included Taiwan as one of the “leading regional partners” with whom relations must be strengthened under the Indo-Pacific strategy.^[48] The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 even granted Taiwan the status of “major non-NATO ally” and mandated that “the United States should increase its support to a free and open society in the face of aggressive efforts by [the PRC].”^[49] Such a strong sense of geopolitical roles has also been held by the Taiwanese government. President Tsai Ing-wen explicitly stated that amid an international landscape where “China, through its rise and expansion, utilises an authoritarian system combined with nationalism and economic power to challenge the values of liberal democracy and the world order,” Taiwan – “situated on the strategic front line of the Indo-Pacific region” – has “become the first line of defence in safeguarding democratic values.”^[50]

Given Taiwan’s substantive and symbolic significance, the US significantly upgraded its multifaceted cooperation with Taiwan. Starting in 2018, the US passed and implemented a series of Taiwan-friendly laws, including the Taiwan Travel Act (2018), which encouraged official visits between US and Taiwanese officials at all levels; the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (2018), which reaffirmed commitments to arms sales to Taiwan and the maintenance of peace in the Taiwan Strait; the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative Act (Taipei Act) (2020), which required the US to assist Taiwan in strengthening its diplomatic ties and participating in international organisations; the Taiwan Assurance Act (2020), which mandated regular defensive arms sales to Taiwan, promoted Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organisations, and required a review of the State Department’s guidelines on Taiwan relations; and the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act, passed as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023, which authorised the US to assist Taiwan in developing a defence modernisation plan, strengthen bilateral defence partnerships, and provide Foreign Military Financing to Taiwan from 2023 to 2027. In terms of security, the US continued to provide routine arms sales to Taiwan, while also, for the first time since 1979, providing direct military assistance. Biden even publicly declared that the US would use its forces to defend Taiwan in the event of an attack by China. On the economic front, the US enhanced its cooperation with Taiwan from 2020 through the Economic Prosperity Partnership Dialogue, covering areas such as supply chain security and resilience, countering economic coercion, energy security, and investment screening. In 2023, the US also signed the United States–Taiwan Initiative on 21^st-Century Trade, the most comprehensive trade agreement between the two nations since 1979, aimed at deepening bilateral trade and economic relations.

Moreover, the US has actively sought to integrate Taiwan into democratic value-based partnership networks. Bilaterally, the Taiwan–US Consultations on Democratic Governance in the Indo-Pacific Region have been held four times since 2019, which enables officials and experts from Taiwan, the US, and other Indo-Pacific countries to engage in dialogue and cooperation on challenges related to human rights, democracy, and good governance. Multilaterally, the Summit for Democracy has been convened three times since 2021, which provided Taiwan with a platform to share its experience in defending democracy and resisting authoritarianism with other democratic partners.

During this period, the US significantly increased its diplomatic and defence support for Taiwan, driven by the island’s enhanced geopolitical and economic status and its sustained symbolic importance. In terms of security, Taiwan returned to the geopolitical frontline as the US entered a phase of strategic competition with China. Economically, although Taiwan continued to generate a US trade deficit, it reliably supplied advanced semiconductors and increased investment in the US, frequently exceeding US investment in Taiwan since 2014^[51] and supporting US competitiveness against China in both economic and technological domains. Ideologically, Taiwan served as the frontline of the free world against authoritarian expansion.

Taiwan’s agency

Although Taiwan’s adoption of US political and economic models was largely driven by its entrenchment in global hegemonic competition, it has also demonstrated agency by strategically embracing the values promoted by US hegemony. From the Cold War period to the post-Cold War era, the practice of leveraging domestic legitimacy to enhance international legitimacy has been consistently implemented across different stages of Taiwan’s development.

Before the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, Chiang Kai-shek’s regime implemented certain liberal measures under martial law to secure assistance from the US. These included allowing private individuals to establish a “free press,” such as the Free China Journal 自由中國半月刊, thereby shaping the image of a “free China.” However, following the signing of the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty in 1954, the authorities began dismantling these democratic façades. For instance, the Free China Journal was shut down in 1960, and its publisher was imprisoned (Lin 2000). From the 1970s, Taiwan faced growing diplomatic challenges. In response, Chiang Kai-shek’s successor, Chiang Ching-kuo, sought to compensate for Taiwan’s weakened international legitimacy by implementing limited political reforms. These included holding supplementary elections for central representatives and appointing more native Taiwanese to party and government positions. To address demands for political reform from the US and domestic socio-political movements, Chiang lifted martial law, along with bans on political parties and the press, in 1987 (Wakabayashi 2016). In the post-Cold War era, Lee Teng-hui continued to translate domestic legitimacy into international legitimacy through a series of constitutional and democratic reforms, including the full parliamentary re-election in 1992 and the first direct presidential election in 1996. In his 1995 Cornell University speech, “With the People Always in My Heart,” Lee sought to leverage Taiwan’s democratic achievements to secure international support.

After democratisation, successive Taiwanese governments have sought to gain international recognition and support by implementing universal values at the local level. Chen Shui-bian (2000–2008), who oversaw Taiwan’s first democratic transfer of power, advocated “democratic diplomacy” and “human rights diplomacy” by establishing the Presidential Office Human Rights Consultative Group (zongtong fu renquan zixun xiaozu 總統府人權諮詢小組) in 2000, founding the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy in 2003 – the first national-level democracy assistance organisation in Asia – and holding Taiwan’s first-ever national referendum in 2004. Ma Ying-jeou (2008–2016), who oversaw the second alternation of the ruling party, further consolidated Taiwan’s democracy by incorporating several international human rights treaties into domestic law, including those related to civil and political rights, economic, social, and cultural rights, as well as the rights of women, persons with disabilities, and children. Tsai Ing-wen (2016–2024), as Taiwan’s first female president, legalised same-sex marriage in 2019 – the first in Asia – established the National Human Rights Commission in 2020, pursued humanitarian pandemic diplomacy during Covid-19, and reoriented Taiwan’s foreign aid towards promoting a “world of shared prosperity and freedom” in response to authoritarian expansion in 2023. Taiwan’s current President, Lai Ching-te (2024–present), has explicitly continued the commitment to “advancing values-based diplomacy, standing shoulder to shoulder with global democracies to form a community of peace.”^[52]

For example, since its establishment in 2003, the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy has promoted collaboration with domestic and international academia, think tanks, non-governmental organisations, political parties, and legislatures to advance policy research, educational initiatives, and exchange programmes related to democracy and human rights. Between 2005 and 2023, the foundation allocated an average of over TWD 43 million annually to support domestic and international initiatives, nearly half (45%) of which funded international activities,^[53] underscoring Taiwan’s commitment to values-based diplomacy. Consequently, Taiwan has been recognised internationally for its commitment to universal values. In the Freedom in the World 2026 global rankings, which assess political rights and civil liberties across 208 countries and territories, Taiwan was rated “free” for the 30th consecutive year, scoring 93 out of 100 and ranking second in Asia behind only Japan.^[54]

Conclusion

This article adopted a great power competition perspective, with a particular emphasis on the ideological dimension, to provide a systematic explanation of US support for Taiwan from the Cold War to the present. Through a longitudinal case study and discourse analysis, it was found that US ideological interests in Taiwan have influenced American support for Taiwan across different historical periods. Specifically, shifts in the US relationship with the Soviet Union and China have led to changing symbolic roles for Taiwan. These include: (1) a bulwark of the capitalist bloc against communist expansion in the early Cold War (1950s–1960s), (2) a successful economic model of capitalism versus communism in the late Cold War (1970s–1980s), (3) a successful democratic model in Asia and a counterpoint to China in the post-Cold War period (1990s–late 2010s), and (4) a frontline in the free world against authoritarian expansion in the new Cold War (late 2010s–present). These ideological considerations have complemented the material interests of security and economics, shaping a pattern in which US overall support for Taiwan has fluctuated while defence support has persisted. The congruence analysis reveals that although Taiwan’s geopolitical and economic significance declined markedly during the late Cold War and post-Cold War periods, US defence support remained stable, suggesting that security and economic interests alone may not fully account for US policy towards Taiwan, thereby reinforcing the explanatory power of ideological interests (Table 1).

Table 1. US hegemonic and ideological interests in Taiwan

Source: author.

This study has several implications. Theoretically, it engages with existing literature on whether US support for Taiwan is driven by defence interests, economic interests, or ideological interests. By integrating a great power competition perspective with cultural hegemony theory, this study provides a more comprehensive understanding of the interplay between geopolitical-economic factors and ideological considerations. While acknowledging the explanatory power of security and economic interests, it emphasises the role and influence of ideological interests and applies Cox’s cultural hegemony framework in international relations to interpret US foreign policy towards Taiwan since the Cold War. Empirically, this study enhances our understanding of Taiwan’s shifting ideological role in global geopolitics and the evolution of US policy and discourse over time. Unlike existing research that often focuses on specific historical periods, this article offers a systematic account of Taiwan’s changing symbolic significance to the US. Its relevance extends beyond Taiwan to other US allies and democracies. It illustrates how these actors’ symbolic roles in great power competition, alongside US ideological considerations, shape contemporary strategies in public diplomacy and value promotion.

Although Trump’s 2025 return to office introduces uncertainty regarding the US defence of Taiwan, this article moves beyond short-term, individual-level perspectives to offer a long-term, structural understanding. During his first term, Trump based his national security strategy on his idea of “principled realism,” in which China was redefined as a “revisionist power” for seeking to shape “a world antithetical to US values and interests.”^[55] His second-term Department of State also continues to define US–China relations as “strategic competition” with an intention to “promote accountability for China’s violations of human rights within China and around the globe.”^[56] However, Trump’s latest national security strategy places greater emphasis on safeguarding national security and economic advantage as the primary objectives of his foreign policy, and states his willingness to maintain good commercial relations with countries that have different governing systems “without imposing on them democratic or other social change.” Nonetheless, the report simultaneously includes the “Protection of Core Rights and Liberties” among the “Priorities” of the overall strategy and makes clear that the US will continue to “push like-minded friends to uphold our shared norms” with countries that share these democratic principles.^[57] Additionally, there continues to be bipartisan support in the US Congress for democratic Taiwan and a vigilance towards authoritarian China. Despite ongoing concerns over whether the US should move from its long-standing policy of “strategic ambiguity” to “strategic clarity,”^[58] and whether the US would actually deploy troops to defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion, developments since the late 2010s have reflected a trend of increasing US support for Taiwan. These developments include the US strengthening its arms sales to Taiwan and enhancing bilateral security cooperation; Biden’s public pledge to defend Taiwan; and the current Trump administration’s public affirmation of US determination to deter conflict in the Taiwan Strait and to “deny any attempt to seize Taiwan.” Through the lens of hegemonic competition, the article illuminates how ideological considerations often shape US foreign policy more consistently than fluctuating material interests.

Acknowledgements

This work was supported by Taiwan’s National Science and Technology Council under Grant NSTC 112-2410-H-004-074-MY3. I am grateful to Dr Brian C. H. Fong, Dr Svetlana Vassiliouk, and the two anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments on earlier versions of this article. I would also like to thank Hung-Yen Hsu and Hui Shan Leong for their research assistance.

Manuscript received on 12 April 2025. Accepted on 11 December 2025.
 

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